By Invitation: Prof Dhruva Kumar
When presidents of the United States and Russia meet, the ripples are global; when they meet in Anchorage, those ripples reach New Delhi’s doorstep. The Trump–Putin talks on August 15, 2025, produced no ceasefire or sweeping bargain, but they did change the arithmetic for India, politically, economically and strategically.
Thursday’s summit at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson was meant to showcase Trump’s dealmaking prowess. Instead, it revealed the hollow nature of American leverage when wielded without strategic wisdom. Putin got his opportunities, his F-22 flyovers, and his ride in the presidential limousine. What did America get? Vague promises of “understanding” while Russian missiles continued pounding Ukrainian cities during the very hours both leaders smiled for cameras.
The real winner wasn’t in that Alaska conference room, it was 8,000 miles away in New Delhi, where Indian policymakers watched American credibility crumble in real time.
The Tariff Trap: Punishing Friends, Rewarding Adversaries
Let’s address the elephant in the room: Trump’s decision to impose a crushing 50% tariff on $87 billion worth of Indian goods while treating Putin as an honoured guest represents perhaps the most strategically confused policy in modern American diplomacy.
The mathematics alone should embarrass any serious policymaker. India purchases 1.4 million barrels daily of Russian oil, roughly $42 billion annually at current prices. The European Union, despite its loud sanctions rhetoric, still imports €35.9 billion worth of Russian goods, including record levels of liquefied natural gas. Yet somehow, it’s India that faces economic punishment for energy pragmatism.
Prof Dhruva Kumar, politician, educationist and geo-politics expert, comments, when Europeans can import Russian LNG to heat their homes, why can’t we import Russian crude to fuel our growth?” It’s a question Trump’s team seems incapable of answering convincingly.
The numbers reveal the deeper absurdity. Russia-India bilateral trade reached $68.7 billion in 2024-25, a six-fold increase from pre-pandemic levels. But this growth reflects market forces, not political alignment. Indian refiners report Russian crude discounts have narrowed from $30 per barrel in 2022 to just $5 today, hardly the windfall Washington portrays.
How will neighbours react?
Here’s what should truly worry American strategists: Trump’s India policy is delivering Beijing exactly what it desires, a wedge between the world’s two largest democracies.
Recent signs of India-China rapprochement aren’t coincidental. Direct flights between Delhi and Shanghai resumed after a four-year suspension. Tibetan pilgrimage sites reopened to Indian visitors. Prime Minister Modi is reportedly considering his first China visit in seven years for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit.
None of this represents a fundamental realignment, but it signals India’s willingness to explore alternatives when faced with American economic coercion. Beijing’s diplomats are surely noting that Trump’s 50% tariffs on India contrast sharply with his 19% rates for Pakistan, a country that’s increasingly integrated into China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
The Arctic Opening: Russia’s New Card
Buried beneath Alaska summit headlines lies a development with profound long-term implications: the acceleration of India-Russia Arctic cooperation.
Moscow has offered New Delhi icebreaker construction partnerships, sailor training programs, and Northern Sea Route access, potentially reducing shipping times to Europe by 40% while providing alternative energy supplies through Arctic LNG projects. This isn’t just about oil; it’s about reshaping global trade flows independently of traditional Western-controlled routes.
What India Should Do Next
The path forward requires neither confrontation nor capitulation, but strategic patience combined with tactical flexibility.
First, prioritise energy resilience. Fill strategic petroleum reserves, diversify suppliers through long-term contracts with Gulf and other producers, and adapt refinery configurations to run a broader set of crude grades. Second, stabilise trade and financial channels. Open direct talks with Washington to seek clarity and carve-outs for vulnerable exporters, and expand formal swap lines and alternative settlement mechanisms to reduce transactional fragility. Third, speed defence-industrial reform. Identify single-source vulnerabilities, fast-track domestic production under Atmanirbhar Bharat and secure time-bound guarantees for spares where diplomacy can help.
Finally, strengthen third-country triangulation, particularly through UAE partnerships, enabling refined product exports to Europe using Russian crude inputs. This maintains commercial viability while reducing direct sanctions exposure.
The Alaska meeting was not, in itself, an emergency for India. But the policy window it opened will close if New Delhi waits. Strategic autonomy requires speed as well as judgement, and this moment calls for both.
Professor Dhruva Kumar is Glasgow based Scottish-Indian Who Is Also Scottish Politician, Educationist, Geoeconomic Strategist & Analyst
